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Pre-emptive Value 
NATHAN MOORE* 
This article begins from the assumption that neoliberal 
economies de-emphasise use value and exchange value in 
favour of modes of valuation related to risk and uncertainty. 
One effect of this is to leave individuals constantly exposed 
to an always uncertain future which can only be apparently 
mitigated through ‘joining’ or being ‘assigned to’ particular 
categories of the population (for example, ‘home-owner’). 
However, given that risk necessarily re-imparts uncertainty, 
any such assignment, with the aim of reducing risk, is only 
ever provisional and temporary. To clarify this, the paper 
will consider the interplay of limit and threshold in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s work, whilst also suggesting that property is 
becoming displaced by contracts. Through this latter 
arrangement, value is dependent upon, and increasingly 
articulated as, the attempt to constantly outrun uncertainty 
before it re-appears once more. As such, this paper will argue 
that a workable definition of value could be: ‘value is the 
current assertion of what value will be’. 
 
Since the economic crash of 2008 has not led to the collapse of the 
capitalist system, the question of just what capitalism is, and how it 
functions, has received renewed interest. Arguably, one thing has 
become clear: that whilst the crash has had a range of often 
catastrophic socio-political consequences, economies themselves have 
been able to adapt their functioning to the new realities with 
remarkable ease. Negative socio-political consequences do not mean 
negative economic consequences; and, more to the point, it is 
obvious that negative socio-political consequences can have 
advantageous economic results—at least for certain sections of the 
population.1 
                                                       
* Dr Nathan Moore is senior lecturer in law and director of postgraduate research 
at Birkbeck School of Law. 
1 See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine (Penguin 2008).  
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In light of this, the question of value continues to be a pressing 
one. I mean by this the question of what value is, how it arises, and 
what impact it has on the organisation and governance of human life. 
Clearly, these are big questions, and there is no space here to address 
them adequately.2 Instead, I will restrict myself to thinking through 
certain effects of the following proposition: value comes from the 
future. 3  The point is, of course, an obvious one: once finance 
becomes the dominant activity in an economy, then the generation of 
value in the present becomes indexed to a discursive and speculative 
regime as to what value will be in the future. If so, then a sort of 
temporal short circuit takes effect, where present and future begin to 
pass through each other with ever-increasing rapidity.4  
Despite the fact that the question of value is no longer 
determined through the presentation of more material factors (such 
as labour time or physical scarcity), it might seem that something 
like finance should be restricted to the realm of signs and 
calculations, with little meaning for life in the material world. Of 
course, this is not the case, and it is particularly clear that it is not 
the case when one considers something as physical and unavoidable 
as space; or, more to the point, land. In post-crash England, the 
conjunction of two things has helped to make land a more desirable 
alternative to investments in shares and bonds: the construction and 
promotion, from the 1980s onwards, of the so-called ‘property 
ladder’ as a means to promote a competitive market in residential 
properties; and the overhaul of land registration which, in 2003, saw 
an entrenchment of the conceptual logic of proprietorship due to 
registration rather than possession, and which therefore made 
                                                       
2 Anthropologist David Graeber is noticeable for tackling the question of value, 
both in Towards an Anthropological Theory of Value (Palgrave Macmillan 2002) 
and more recently Debt: The First 5,000 Years (Melville House 2014); Also of 
importance here is the work on enrichment undertaken by Luc Botanski and Arnaud 
Esquerre: Enrichissement (Gallimard 2017). 
3 See Mary Mellor’s investigation of how money functions, with particular reference 
to the future, in The Future of Money (Pluto Press 2010); for a more general 
account of the growing significance of the future as both a tool of governance and 
as a present existential condition, see Nathan Moore, The Decision: Artisans in a 
Time of Control (FUP, forthcoming). 
4 For an account, and critique, of the condition of acceleration, see the work of Paul 
Virilio, in particular Speed and Politics (Mark Polizzotti tr, Semiotext(e) 1986). 
Nathan Moore 
 61 
owning land without occupying it a much less risky proposition than 
it had been previously. 
The practice of ‘buy to leave’, which has flourished in the past 
seven years or so, serves as a useful illustration of economic activity 
that became possible because of this conjunction of the ideology of 
the property ladder with registration. At this point a well-known 
phenomenon, buy to leave is the practice of purchasing estates in 
residential land, so as to leave the land unoccupied whilst the capital 
value of the estate increases. London’s Evening Standard newspaper 
has been a frequent and vocal opponent of the growth of buy to 
leave investments in London, presenting these as a significant factor 
in putting purchase of an estate beyond the means of the average 
Londoner. For example, on 21st October 2015 it reported, 
The stampede of investment has been blamed for pushing 
property prices beyond Londoners’ reach and in some 
cases has been linked with money laundering and tax 
evasion. Two-thirds of the purchases were made by 
companies registered in just four ‘British’ tax havens—
Jersey, Guernsey, the Isle of Man and the British Virgin 
Islands, according to the Land Registry data obtained by 
Private Eye magazine through freedom of information 
requests. 
This point finds support in a report published by Civitas in the 
previous year, Finding Shelter.5 Highlighting the extent to which 
‘prime property’ purchases were being made to overseas buyers, it 
stated that 
[London’s] property has become, first and foremost, a 
‘global reserve currency’. The property market is no longer 
about people making a long-term investment in owning 
their shelter, but a place for the world’s richest people to 
park their money at an annualized rate of return of around 
10%.  
The extent of the problem is such that a number of local 
authorities see a need to take steps to dis-incentivise the practice of 
                                                       
5 <http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/FindingShelter.pdf> accessed November 2017 
(pages 5-6). 
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buy to leave, at the forefront of which stands Islington Borough 
Council. The council requires developers and purchasers of new 
build residential property to undertake a s 1066 obligation that the 
property will be occupied and used for residential purposes. In 
particular, such properties should not be left vacant for longer than 
three months and, if they are, then fines can be imposed.7 
In early 2016 Graham Norwood, writing in The Financial 
Times, pointed out that the full extent of buy to leave is difficult to 
gauge, but two things were underscored in his account: that buy to 
leave is most commonly used in relation to more ‘high end’ 
residential properties, where the capital gain is of course more likely 
to yield a higher return than ‘lower end’ properties for purchasers; 
and that a slowing down of England’s property market does not (yet) 
seem to be a major consideration for those practicing buy to leave. 
The latter point is explained by the relevant comparator; because the 
property is being purchased as an investment, the relevant 
comparator is not house prices generally, but the value of alternative 
potential investments: ‘buy-to-leave purchasers appear more 
concerned by plummeting oil prices and falling Chinese growth, 
according to those who help them find London investment 
properties.’8 The first point, about ‘high end’ property, is significant 
because it suggests that developers will be more likely to build for 
that particular market so as to realise the most substantial return on 
their (i.e. the developer’s) investment; the use of off-plan sales seems 
to confirm this point. This in turn adds to the ever-shrinking pool of 
available ‘affordable’ housing for those keen to become owner-
occupiers. 
If we ask, as a response to this, where the value generated by 
buy to leave investment comes from, the answer is obvious: the 
scarcity of the asset invested in. Such scarcity arises from two factors: 
the desire for the asset which, with the usual tragic overtones, not 
only fuels its scarcity but also then intensifies the desire for it; and 
                                                       
6 Town and Country Planning Act 1990. 
7 More information on Islington’s ‘wasted housing policy’ can be found at 
<https://www.islington.gov.uk/planning/planningpol/pol_supplement/prevent-
wasted-housing> accessed November 2017. 
8 <https://www.ft.com/content/6954f798-cb2c-11e5-a8ef-ea66e967dd44> accessed 
November 2017. 
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the physical scarcity of properties appropriate for investments of this 
kind. Like many such investments, the decision is made in the 
present to invest in it with the expectation that it will be worth more 
in the future. The primary thing here is not that the investment 
provides an income stream, but that it will be a safe haven for money 
now and in the future. We might say that the desirability of buy to 
leave is premised upon the expectation that, in the future, there will 
be more scarcity. If so, it becomes immediately obvious that the 
detrimental socio-political fall-out of the scarcity of residential 
property is not simply an unfortunate side effect, but an essential 
motor for the generation of (future) value through something like 
buy to leave. We might even go so far as to say that, to facilitate this, 
it is not a question of producing less, but rather of producing more 
of what is not needed. The seemingly paradoxical situation is that 
developers of high end residential property are, in fact, producing 
scarcity. How has this come to be acceptable? 
In one sense, the production of scarcity can be read as an 
historically continuous process, inasmuch as the absorption, 
expenditure, and/or sacrifice of potential surpluses has been 
necessary to maintain the status quo of any given society. This point, 
of course, was made by Georges Bataille in his study of economy and 
sovereignty, The Accursed Share.9 It was subsequently picked up in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus as ‘anti-production’. 10 
However, at the core of such a reading is the question of what we 
mean by ‘surplus value’: is surplus the production of too much, of 
more than is necessary for subsistence, making it necessary to absorb 
such surpluses in sacrifice or profit? Or is it a matter of producing, 
first and foremost, these surpluses as the very basis for socio-
economic activity, so that what counts as ‘subsistence’, or the 
production of survival, can be measured off and defined in relation 
to surpluses? In Anti-Oedipus, it is the latter question which is taken 
to get to the heart of things.11 
The significance of this point is that value, under a capitalist 
regime, is not rooted in material facts, such as labour time or 
                                                       
9 Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share (Robert Hurley tr, Zone 1991). 
10 Robert Hurley et al. tr, U Minn P 1983. See Chapter 3 in particular. 
11 ibid 
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physical scarcity, but instead derives from discursive regimes through 
which it becomes possible to see value and to speak of it. 
Nevertheless it is possible, even within capitalism, to discern two 
tendencies at work: one that, through ritual, constantly re-
inaugurates value as connected to some physical object (whether 
human or thing); and another that seeks to mitigate the physical 
object, and thereby disconnect value from humans and things. In the 
latter case, value becomes referable only to itself and this, I wish to 
maintain, is the condition of pre-emptive value: present value is 
referable only to its future value (or, indeed, its future scarcity). This 
is not to say that the latter tendency successfully erases its object, but 
that it functions through a discursive regime that actively seeks, and 
claims, to do so. 
To clarify these points let’s begin by considering the first 
tendency, where it is necessary to connect value to some object. If we 
follow the Bataillean-Deleuzeo-Guattarian line, the connection to 
some object is necessary so that this object can be wasted in some 
way: hoarded so as to be put out of circulation; or expended in some 
wasteful gesture; or made a gift of; or, indeed, sacrificed or allowed 
to die. Through such methods surplus value can be produced and, by 
reference to it, the ‘normal’ standard of survival defined. For us in 
the West, the most contemporary means of attaching value to some 
object is, of course, money, by which I mean (in this context) notes 
and coins. This is, perhaps, of pertinence, given that physical money 
now seems to be in decline—because one thing that such a decline 
brings to the forefront is the question of just what money is. If this is 
a difficult question to answer, it is because money only ever 
manifests, as a physical thing, through the simultaneous erasure of 
itself: notes and coins are money, but they are not the money’s value. 
Money is only ever the representative of value, thereby standing in 
for value (being substituted for it) and, in this, it does no more than 
stand in for itself.  
Lacan’s reading of Poe’s The Purloined Letter is well known, 
being the letter that is only in place when it is out of place.12 
However, the better reference here might be Michel Serres’ ‘quasi-
object’ which, like the purloined letter, is constantly out of place but 
                                                       
12 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits (Bruce Fink tr, W&W Norton 2007). 
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which is also—and this is emphasised by Serres—constantly in 
circulation. 13  By circulating, the quasi-object weaves together a 
community of those through whose hands it passes, and it is 
important that it does not stay in any one pair of hands for too 
long14—to do so means that a surplus will become evident. Such a 
surplus, we might surmise, would be a surplus of too much 
discursiveness, as if the thing in circulation were to become 
overburdened by the disparity between its object-ness on the one 
hand, and what is said about it on the other, as it becomes 
increasingly stationary. Without continuous movement, the quasi-
object (e.g. money) would be revealed as too obviously representing 
nothing but itself, as something both present and absent. Of course, 
the opposite opinion that value is not a matter of circulation but of 
intrinsic worth is not unknown—John Locke, for one, considered it 
crucial that the representative value of coins should match their 
inherent, material value, in terms of the amount of precious metal 
they contained15—but the impossibility of ever achieving this in any 
practical sense underscores the fact that money never coincides with 
its own value, and only ever stands in for itself. 
To say this—that money stands in for itself—is to say no more 
than that money is debt.16 Debt is not a physical thing but a relation; 
nevertheless, such a relation is material in its effects. This distinction 
between physical and material indicates the complexity of how 
something like money works and feeds into, I believe, the long 
philosophical investigation of the relation between things and words. 
Without being able to justify it here,17 it seems to me that one way in 
which discursive regimes produce material effects is by linking such 
discursive performances to physical things. If so, something like 
money is functionally necessary (or at least convenient) for certain 
types of discursive practice. More to the point, the discursive link to 
                                                       
13 Michel Serres, The Parasite (Lawrence R. Schehr tr, U Minn P 2007). 
14 ibid 
15 Constantine George Caffentzis, Clipped Coins—Abused Words and Civil 
Government (Autonomedia 1990). 
16 See Mellor (n 3) and Graeber, Debt (n 2). 
17 In my forthcoming book The Decision, I do discuss the relations between words 
and things in the context of assemblages, drawing upon the work of Foucault, 
Deleuze and Guattari, Agamben, Esposito and Flusser. 
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something physical helps to make such discursiveness persuasive, by 
producing something that stands in for, and represents, the 
discursive relation of (crudely) addressor and addressee.  
In terms of money, there are two elements in play: on one side 
is the credo, the faith in debt and credit, by which it is possible to 
communicate that this thing or relation has value; exactly, it is the 
crediting of a thing or relation with value. Following Bataille in 
particular, this is a system of sacrifice, inasmuch as it sets up a 
system of substitutions where values are not made equitable, but 
they are assigned magnitudes. Values there are never equal to one 
another; they are only ever bigger or smaller than each other and, in 
this, it becomes possible to sacrifice one for another, the smaller for 
the larger. This can be considered as an almost magical aspect to 
sacrifice, whereby the lesser is made qualitatively equivalent to the 
larger, and so is able to stand in for (be sacrificed for) the latter. If 
we can believe in the latter, it is because other values have been 
sacrificed on their (and our) behalf. Differences and substitutions 
between such values, we might say, are intensive.  
But this magical act is not enough so,18 on the other side, there 
is the thing that represents these sacrifices and substitutions; this is 
the thing that circulates and, in so doing, also legislates. By 
‘legislates’, I mean that the circulation of the physical representative 
creates a normative system of circulation—it cannot circulate in just 
any old way, because this would be nothing more than contingency 
or chaos. Rather, a ritualistic and predictive manner of circulation 
has to be established so that actions can become extrinsically 
differentiated and, through such differentiation, meaningfully 
compared. The differences on this side are extensive, being equitable 
to each other, even if only as ratios, allowing for exchange rather 
                                                       
18 Agamben’s recent work on what he calls the ontological machine explains why 
the magical side, by itself, is insufficient: magic gives authority but it does not justify 
actions. Instead, an apparatus is required that can hold together, simultaneously and 
non-dialectically, being (magic) and action (legislation) as two disjunctive, but 
necessary, functions. See The Use of Bodies (Adam Kotsko tr, Stanford UP 2016). 
Also relevant is the ‘Apparatus of Capture’ chapter of Deleuze and Guattari’s A 
Thousand Plateaus (Brian Massumi tr, U Minn P 1987). 
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than (sacrificial) substitution. These two sides are being and action19 
or, for the purposes of this example, value and money. 
That a thing is value goes to the very root of the social 
constitution that recognises that value; in this, it would seem original 
and originating because all that can be said of it is—and this is the 
magical moment that binds the community—‘of course it is valuable’. 
This value cannot be explained, it can only be jointly recognised. But, 
in this, it only seems to be at the origin; that it is not at the origin is 
shown by the ritualistic repetition that re-inaugurates it time and 
again: its value is not self-evident, having to be repeatedly attributed 
to it in a slip from ‘it is valuable’ to ‘it has value’. The origin is, after 
all, in the middle of things. Nevertheless, it is a middle that is 
constantly projected into a past: the past from which the current 
community emerged and developed, giving a certain value as 
repeated tradition. 20  If so, money serves a relatively predictable 
representation of what value is, to the extent that it is exchanged and 
desired as if it is valuable. The link to a circulating and physical 
thing allows for the elision between is valuable and has value to 
occur. 
If so, what has value is that which guarantees continuity. 
Continuity here means the diminution and limitation of uncertainty 
and contingency: what has value is predictability. To make the cycle 
repeat as it should it is necessary to appease the gods; for things to 
unfold naturally and beneficially, as they should, a large amount of 
intervention is required; it takes a lot of work to make things look 
natural. It takes a lot of work for everyone to be able to say, ‘yes, of 
course this thing is valuable’, whether we are talking about gold bars, 
the institution of marriage, shares in IBM, or a more prosperous 
future for our children. The important thing about value is that this 
work has to be hidden behind something: rare metal, registration, 
                                                       
19 ibid 
20 The radical impulse is often to proclaim that the true nature of the origin has 
become distorted through time, and that we must return to the purity of this first, 
true value; e.g. from constituted to constituent. Such a move also occurs always in 
the middle. 
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certification, economic growth;21 this is the magic through which 
value is. 
Deleuze and Guattari pick up on a certain strand of economic 
thinking when it comes to the question of making values 
comparable22 and, in so doing, provide a useful clarification of the 
way in which value works as a predictable and repetitive 
continuity.23 For them, values are initially equated at a specific point, 
the zero degree from which all subsequent comparisons are to be 
worked out. This specific point is the limit, the degree at which any 
increase in the production and/or circulation of a particular thing 
would cause a radical transformation of the society in question. For 
example, the point at which the production of seeds, beyond the 
amount necessary for the subsistence of the community, would lead 
to the hoarding and accumulation of this excess, demanding a 
wholly new internal economy as to how such seeds are dealt with 
which would, in turn, lead to a transformation of the community 
itself.24 If so it is an excess because it cannot be absorbed without the 
community in question being radically transformed; incidentally, it is 
also only from this point of excess that it is possible to determine 
what is ‘normal’, as the amount necessary for the basic repetition of 
the community in question.25 A radical transformation would be the 
                                                       
21 I would argue for all of these examples being physical, in which case the inclusion 
of something like ‘economic growth’ might understandably cause raised eyebrows. 
However, even a physical thing such as gold does not have its value ‘in’ it, indicating 
that the physicality is not the same as the value itself. Instead, ‘physical’ should 
perhaps be understood as something like an obstacle, that serves as a break upon, or 
limit to, the human ability to desire, plan, and imagine. It is this physical limiting 
that then makes such a thing suitable as a representative of value. By contrast, I 
would then argue for materiality as something more propulsive, which does not 
block but rather propels an action or engagement. In other words, I would assign 
physicality as a function of being, and materiality as a function of action. 
22 A Thousand Plateaus (n 18). 
23 The relationship between repetition and continuity should be clarified because 
repetition is, after all, discontinuous. Continuity would then be the promotion of 
only a seeming continuity, at the expense of the break implicit to repetition; more 
precisely, continuity would be the magic of an ‘of course’ standing in for the more 
volatile being of difference. For more on this, see Gilles Deleuze, Difference and 
Repetition (Paul Patton tr, Columbia UP 1995). 
24 (n 18).  
25 Following on from (n 23) above, the normal level of functioning, to produce what 
passes as subsistence or survival in a given community, is only so because it can 
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revenge of surplus value, as a return of an excess that must be 
otherwise dissipated, wasted, or unproductively used up if things are 
to remain the same.  
In Deleuze and Guattari’s account, it is trade that marks this 
limit: an excess is avoided by trading it. More to the point, the 
valuation of this excess, that makes it capable of being so exchanged, 
occurs by reference to another such excess: the point at which two 
different commodities become equivalent is the point at which both, 
independently, would otherwise threaten an excessive 
transformation. 26  In keeping with Deleuze and Guattari’s more 
general point about the primacy of surplus value, the normal, 
subsistence value of the things in question is then worked out from 
this moment of excess. What this underscores is that what has value 
in such an arrangement is the ritualistic repetition (and consequent 
seeming continuity) of the community in question, through the 
dissipation of an excess that would otherwise threaten it but which 
also, at the same time, grounds it, by making a normative system see-
able and say-able. 
Unsurprisingly, all of this points to a fundamental instability in 
both the being of value, and in the activity by which it circulates. 
Consequently, the excessive degree does not occur simply at a limit 
point, or on a border, but is immanent to the functioning of the 
community as a whole. The limit is not a special or exceptional case, 
but is in fact the normal functioning of the conjunction of value and 
thing. This makes it impossible to determine which comes first 
(being/value or action/thing), as both are constantly passing through 
each other. In a slightly more sophisticated example than that of the 
exchange of seeds and axes in Deleuze and Guattari’s account,27 we 
can consider how this instability can transform the thing itself, as 
well as the human relationships which exist in reference to that thing. 
As an example, the well-known property law case of Tulk v 
                                                                                                                              
successfully conceal the discontinuities upon which it depends. The point of un-
absorbable excess is the degree at which the discontinuity becomes evident and, 
consequently, transformative (for better or worse). 
26 Deleuze and Guattari give the example of seeds traded for axes: see (n 18). 
27 ibid 
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Moxhay28 is indicative of how it is possible for some valuable thing 
to ramify itself. 
In Tulk, a case from 1848 regarding Leicester Square in 
London, an agreement between a seller and purchaser of land that 
the purchaser would not use the land for certain purposes, nor build 
on it, was held to be enforceable against a third party purchaser of 
the estate. Clearly, this was a contractual agreement as between the 
two original parties, but its subsequent enforcement against the later 
purchaser meant that a subtle shift occurred, through which the 
original in personam obligation took on aspects of an in rem one. 
Through this process a chain of events was set in motion which 
would lead, through subsequent case law,29 to the creation of a new 
type of property where none existed before, today known as a 
restrictive covenant. This is not a question of the courts discovering a 
new type of property, but of them creating this new property by 
extracting it, as a surplus, from what property was thought to be up 
until that point. This new property was created in the same process 
by which it was extracted, as if the parasite had given birth to its 
own host. The combination of estate (value) and land (thing) is thus 
not immune from further manipulation and transformation, as a new 
feature of the estate is extracted (restrictive covenants) and made 
operative across at least two such estates (as a burden and benefit), 
and—more to the point—becomes a valuable thing in its own right 
as a consequence.30 
There is obviously a host of interesting socio-economic factors 
at play in such a development, but for my purposes what is 
important is the extraction of a new property from the abstract 
concept of title, which places certain limits on what an owner of one 
of these abstract titles (i.e. freehold) can do, physically, on the 
relevant land itself. More prosaically, it illustrates the containment of 
a potential excess in terms of an otherwise unbridled power to use 
                                                       
28 (1848) 2 Ph 774. 
29 See Austerberry v Oldham Corporation (1885) 29 Ch D 750, London CC v Allen 
[1914] 3 KB 642 and Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310. 
30 For example, see Wrotham Park Estates v Parkside Homes [1974] 1 WLR 798 
where the cost of breaching a restrictive covenant was assessable as the reasonable 
price that could be charged for a licence to carry out the activity prohibited by the 
covenant. 
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one’s land in any way that one sees fit.31 This cuts across both sides 
of the process: a physical thing (land) is made valuable through the 
construction of abstract titles (e.g. freehold), which in turn have a 
value dependent upon the specific physicality of the land in question, 
but which are also capable of generating other property rights which, 
in turn, impact upon just what that physicality can be. 
As well as instigating the emergence of ‘a new thing’, the Tulk 
case also highlights how relationships between humans can be 
determined by such things: the third party purchaser took the land 
subject to an agreement in which he had played no part. Following 
on from above, this shift from in personam to in rem highlights the 
ever shifting relationship between what exists as contract and what 
as property; in Tulk a contract about a thing (the freehold) itself 
became a thing with proprietary effect. However, it is worth noting 
here that this development took time, condensing through a number 
of consecutive judicial decisions. It is not without significance that 
the development and recognition of new properties in land, which 
develop out of initially contractual agreements, have traditionally 
taken time to coalesce. This can be thought of as a controlled process 
for dealing with excess—in the case of land, what might be thought 
of as excessive acts of ownership32—which, through time, give the 
effect of continuity, albeit one extracted from a series of 
discontinuities.  
However, the fate of restrictive covenants seems far removed 
from a practice such as buy to leave, and this brings us on to the 
second capitalistic tendency referred to earlier on. With something 
such as buy to leave, the specificity of the physical thing has an 
                                                       
31 Of course, tort provides significant restrictions on how land might be used, but 
this within a highly specific regime. The development of restrictive covenants were 
understood as allowing for a sort of private planning law, that could be more 
specific and flexible than the legal provisions otherwise available. Today, perhaps a 
good example of a contentious, and arguably excessive, use of freehold ownership is 
the practice of the ‘super-rich’ building extensive basements under their properties in 
Kensington, Chelsea, etc. 
32 This is not to say, of course, that all such excesses are finally admitted—many are 
rejected almost out of hand. See, for example, the argued for ‘easement of 
protection from the weather’ in Phipps v Pears [1965] 1 QB 76; for a more 
ambiguous proprietary status, consider inchoate equities arising by, for example, 
estoppel, and the effect of Land Registration Act 2002, s 116. 
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extremely attenuated function, inasmuch as the use of the land, for 
occupation, building, resource extraction, etc. has no significant role 
to play. The physicality of the land is only significant in terms of its 
location and, more to the point, how that physicality then 
contributes to rendering that particular location evermore scarce. In 
an important sense, the physical thing underpinning the value is 
inverted, being taken out of circulation and, through this, 
contributing to an expected increase in the value of the relevant 
estate. In such cases, the most important aspect of physicality is its 
inaccessibility, which then contributes to a longer term production of 
scarcity. The crucial moment is the effective disappearance of the 
physical thing, so that value can become more directly referable to its 
own (future) self. This marks an important shift, because it points to 
the new dominance of a mode of value creation where the 
connection to a physical thing is minimised for the purposes of 
circulation or, even, dispensed with altogether: the title becomes 
valuable because the linked physical thing has been completely 
withdrawn. 
If we return to Deleuze and Guattari’s account, we should 
understand this withdrawal of the physical thing as a crossing of the 
limit. For Deleuze and Guattari, the limit was only ever the 
penultimate point; beyond this, the ultimate point is that of the 
threshold.33 In this play of limit and threshold, the temporal collapse 
of present and future becomes evident: once one has crossed the limit, 
it is already too late to turn back; events will have been set in motion 
which will inevitably cause fundamental transformations in the 
community concerned, and crossing the threshold has become 
inevitable. This highlights the functional relativity of a surplus or 
excess: beyond the limit, the excess is no longer seen or said as 
excessive, but becomes a process of transformation. At the core of 
this is a loosening of continuity and predictability: the transformative 
process is, inherently, unpredictable. The question then is: how does 
this new riskiness impact on value? As is obvious—even before 
2008—volatility can be a profound source of value in its own right, 
but the condition for this is that, precisely, the link to any circulating 
and community building thing must be minimised or, if possible, 
completely dispensed with. Such values arise in that space between 
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the limit and threshold, being a space of uncertainty, shock, disaster, 
and impending catastrophe—relatively speaking, of course. Such 
values can be thought of as a seemingly paradoxical formula, as a 
‘pure’ relationality without any specific terms being in any actual 
relation to each other.34 This is the zone between limit and threshold 
and, whereas the previous practice of linking to a thing ultimately 
served to place limits upon the potential of value, this interzone 
allows for an emancipation of such potentials by shifting value from 
debt to risk. 
Once past the limit, the value of certainty diminishes. A 
certainty will not generate future value; rather, being certain seems 
to neutralise the value producing capacity of the future. Instead, 
there must be a risk of loss, of scarcity and, even, of disaster, if 
future derived value is to be generated here, in the present. The sense 
of disaster or catastrophe derives from a speeding up of relations, no 
longer seeking to establish predictability in a slow move from in 
personam to in rem, but ramifying through a proliferation of 
accelerated in personam relationships. Primarily, this is a discursive 
and communicative regime, being one that works by cultivating faith 
and belief, no matter how fleeting, in the likelihood, or not, of a 
future loss and/or gain. Consequently, when this faith is being 
encouraged relative to something like land, it is not a question of 
making land disappear into irrelevancy, but of altering what makes it 
relevant; precisely, faith and belief are now dependent upon the 
production of scarcity: if an estate is to become valuable in the future, 
it is necessary that land is withdrawn, making it uncertain whether 
there will be somewhere to live, to go, or simply to be in the future. 
Rights in action are coming to dominate rights in possession. 
However, before developing this point, it is worth considering 
what this means for how we think of city. By city, I do not mean 
simply urban sprawl or infrastructure, but the idea(s) of city, of what 
it means for humans to live together. The significance of such a 
question will hopefully be readily apparent: the idea of humans 
together has traditionally meant the idea of humans together in some 
place. The interplay of contract and property has historically 
                                                       
34 Such relationality is a common theme in Deleuze’s work. See, for example, the 
discussion of the formula dy/dx in Difference and Repetition (n 23). 
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developed and adapted to changes in the idea(s) of what it means to 
be together in place; but a shift to the prioritisation of contractual 
relations, over and above proprietary ones, undermines the spatial 
aspect of human togetherness, 35  and re-arranges it into new 
formations. As a starting point, it is interesting to note that Plato’s 
Laws,36 in which he sets out his plan for the ideal city, can be read as 
a plan for dealing with the prevention of excess or surplus in the city 
community: limitations on the number of families constitutive of the 
city, limitations upon how much value they are able to hold, 
limitations on governing structures, and so on, are all meant to 
prevent the city from ever reaching its threshold. Instead, the city is 
to be located, optimally, at the limit as the furthest point it can go 
without beginning to transform into something else. 
More recently, the Western interest in, and even passion for, 
the city evident from the end of the 19th century onwards 37 
highlights a set of functions that are by now well known to us: the 
city is a place of self-invention and fashioning; the city is a place for 
encountering difference; the city is the acceleration of life; the city is 
stimulation and over-stimulation; the city is indifference and danger; 
the city is surprising; the city is a threat and a promise. Perhaps it is 
enough to say that the city devoured. But what did it devour, exactly? 
The only answer, I think, is that it devoured quasi-objects, bodies 
and things, but not without also demanding their replacement, the 
substitution of bodies and things by more bodies and things. There is 
something, of course, sacrificial about the city; but the point is that 
the city, in this light, is (but increasingly perhaps, only was) a great 
ferment of quasi-objects. In it, one encounters bodies and things, not 
always sure of the intentions, possibilities, and limitations of these 
bodies and things. Consequently, cities are always re-inaugurating 
themselves, and a new surplus-value is always possible, so that 
                                                       
35 I realise that this sounds a little bit new age-y, but I do not mean, by reference to 
human togetherness, to suggest some sort of universal accord or happy harmony. In 
many ways, just the opposite: how has human togetherness been possible in the face 
of discord, strife, and hatred? An obvious reference here is the question of 
immunity: see Roberto Esposito, Communitas (Timothy C Campbell tr, Stanford 
UP) and Immunitas (Zakiya Hanafi tr, Polity Press 2011). 
36 (Penguin 1970). 
37 For example, see the work of writers such as Charles Baudelaire and Walter 
Benjamin on Paris. 
Nathan Moore 
 75 
something might be added to the situation, deriving from, and 
articulated as, the circulation of objects: money yes, but also the 
streets and places of experience and encounter, the studios and 
factories of production, the nightclubs, bars, and halls of new urban 
musics, the private spaces of refuge and victimisation, and so on. 
For both good and bad, the city is there; yet, following the 
above account, the status of its continued being-there is open to 
question. Perhaps it is too trite to say that, today, the circulation of 
quasi-objects, often ambivalent and dangerous, is being displaced by 
the individual clutching their smart phone. One must never pass on 
one’s smart phone, it’s not for circulation. The smart phone is not of 
the city, but is of the cloud, this cloud being the fantasy of a pure 
virtuality, of a software without hardware, where there is no 
circulation or exchange, but only interfaces. If so, the city cannot 
remain what it has been; it becomes a place of navigation rather than 
encounter, a place to be archived and uploaded rather than 
experienced, and it presents only inputs, meaning that things become 
inputs to be entered into the smart phones and devices. The smart 
phone is the beginning of the end of the quasi-object. If that is so, 
what happens to value once it no longer operates in tandem with the 
circulation of things? Connected to this, why do so many people 
continue to flock to cities? Perhaps the latter can be answered simply: 
devices need inputs, and something needs to go into the various 
social media. However, that is not quite sufficient, because it is not 
as if all of this only happened because of the availability of smart 
phones. So what else? What happens when the limit is crossed, and 
value becomes hermetically virtual? This is the question, of course, 
of financialisation. The key point of financialisation, it seems, is 
acceleration. Prediction, being first, foreseeing, risking, securitising, 
leveraging, shorting, and so on, are all technologies of speed; and 
these speeds of financialisation are now far greater in their 
magnitude than the speeds at which quasi-objects—people and 
things—can circulate. If value were to remain tied to quasi-objects, 
financialisation could not occur. Therefore, it is financialisation that 
has brought about the beginning of the end of the quasi-object; the 
smart phone is just a consequence of what financialisation demands: 
constant (and pre-emptive) communication, in which there is no time 
for the materiality and thing-ness of property to emerge. 
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In the example mentioned above, Tulk v Moxhay, private, 
contractual relations take on the aspect of property by becoming 
enforceable by, and against, individuals who were not the original 
parties to the contract. Enforceability becomes, instead, a matter of 
ownership (for want of a better word). Tulk is an example of putting 
land into circulation, as quasi-object, whilst making the point that 
land, as property, is potentially divisible without end: a new surplus-
value—a new type of property—always remains potentially 
extractible. Between circulation and potential, land as thing is a 
quasi-object that binds through its circulating. But financialisation 
requires a new question to be posed: what happens if there is no 
longer time for contract to become property? What happens if one’s 
contractual liabilities are merely packaged up with other such 
liabilities, to form portfolios from which tranches can be 
contractually bought and sold? If property circulates, securitisation 
displaces, through chains of contracts, and as rapidly as possible so 
that, precisely, the ‘original parties’ are in fact immunised against 
their own liabilities. This is why I say that the chose in possession is 
becoming secondary to the chose in action. If so, it is clearly no 
longer a question of living in property, but of investing in it; of 
trying to preserve what you are contractually entitled to whilst 
displacing what you contractually owe. Maximise the return. 
The last thing that is wanted here is certainty; certainty does 
not produce income for, as any fool knows, low risk is low yield. Is 
it wrong to speculate that the risk of living in the city has been 
completely drawn off in favour of the risk of investing in it? What 
would this mean? In the first place, that the predictability of 
circulation has been de-valorised: it is no longer enough to reach a 
limit, dissipate surplus-value, and repeat. Surplus-value itself has 
become out-moded because finance is not interested in actually 
extracting it; all that counts with finance is the possibility of 
extraction, whether this is expressed as being potentially in the red 
or in the black: loss or gain doesn’t really mean anything to its 
operation, because a loss is only ever relative, a contingent effect 
depending upon the processes of uncertainty being utilised. It is in 
this sense that finance deals in pre-emptive values; that is, mobile 
contractual relations as to the likely value of some asset or 
commodity in the future. Importantly, such assets and commodities 
are not dealt with in isolation, but are constantly re-combined with 
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others such as themselves, in portfolios.38 We can easily understand a 
portfolio as being the spreading of risks across a range of different 
investments; but here, it is something more: it is the de-
materialisation of each asset in favour of its constantly modulating 
relationality. At one instant, it off-sets this asset, at another, this one, 
then it is supporting another asset, and so on. A portfolio is an 
apparatus of pre-emption, that draws the future off and makes it 
operative now, in the present. 
Value is then no longer a ritual, but a set of continuously 
morphing functions and algorithms that respond to the uncertainties 
of a future that they themselves are projecting. This is, in a sense, a 
sort of enclosure or mass privatisation of how it is that things 
become valuable; except that, nothing has been enclosed or taken 
into private ownership. Instead, value has simply been de-linked 
from what stands in for it: money, for example, or the quasi-object 
more generally—now, you can even pay with your smart phone. This 
value is the manipulation of data regarding what data will be, 
encouraging a sort of pseudo-minimalism seeking to jettison all of 
the objects from our lives, and to keep what we need in clouds; as 
the English courts recently confirmed in Your Response v Datateam 
[2014],39 lacking an object, data is not something that can be taken 
into possession.  
The growing dominance of contract over property is a 
necessary feature of de-objectifying. Now, contracts produce ever 
more contracts, through outsourcing, insurance, derivatives, and so 
on, all of which are designed to prevent—for as long as possible—
any performative obligation from ever arising: it’s as if contracts, as 
a whole, were becoming irredeemably executory. In place of 
performance, another contract displacing performance. We have seen 
the consequence when this sort of approach is applied to mortgage 
securitisation. Clearly, this is not a peripheral matter, and the never-
ending chain of contracts goes to the very heart of the emergent 
forms of value to be found in fintech. Blockchain40 is, after all, 
                                                       
38 Ivan Ascher, Portfolio Society (Zone 2016). 
39 [2014] EWCA Civ 281. 
40 Don Tapscott and Alex Tapscott, Blockchain Revolution (Portfolio Penguin 
2016).  
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nothing more than a record of such contractual ‘postponements’ as 
the basis for a new faith and credo that finally realises the dream of 
total surveillance, total transparency, and total verification. It allows 
assessment at a glance, detailing as it does a sealed and approved 
history, of both bodies and things, such that there can be no doubt 
as to their true worth and their true ownership. Blockchain does not 
bind by circulating, but deposits bodies and things in an immoveable 
place, tagging them for all time with the truth of where they have 
been, what they have been, what they have believed, and so on.41 It 
cures the problem of statistics by replacing the substitutions of the 
one and the mass with a massification of the one, a category 
especially for the single individual, unique to them, a data-double 
from which they will never escape: dividuality or, a blockchain 
monad. 
Blockchain offers us a constantly updating, mobile history of 
ourselves, which will fix our identities and guarantee us our 
applicable rights. It will become ridiculous to speak of ‘inalienable’ 
rights: precisely, the constant displacement of rights and obligations 
is how it becomes valuable, as each contract is added to all of the 
preceding ones. It would be naïve to read this as being concerned to 
guarantee the past; rather, it simply opens up new strategies for 
exploiting the future.42 If so, the city becomes increasingly irrelevant 
as the place of human encounter. Being in the city also becomes 
increasingly irrelevant and, in this irrelevance, difficult to defend or 
justify. Instead, the need to preserve city spaces as refuges for 
investment, as sites for consumer opportunities, and as settings for 
electronically archived experiences will, correspondingly, become all 
the easier to insist upon. In other words, one’s very presence in the 
city will depend upon justification: presence will be a matter of 
having a right of access, an accredited purpose, conformable to the 
protocols of the blockchain, something that exists even now in 
embryonic form in those surveillance protocols that look for unusual 
                                                       
41 More accurately, in the context of so-called ‘smart contracts’, the blockchain can 
facilitate an almost immediate execution of the contract so as to make the updated 
blockchain ‘available’ for yet more contracting activity. As such, the discrete 
contract occurs in a smooth space of interminable contracting, making the 
distinction between ‘executory’ and ‘executed’ ever more irrelevant (ibid).  
42 See, for example: <https://www.deribit.com/main#/futures?tab=BTC-24NOV17> 
accessed November 2017. 
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movements or trajectories and, on the basis of which, the presence of 
the individual can be called into question. The post-9/11 emphasis 
upon security is, in this regard, something of a smokescreen. 
To conclude, financialised subjectivity is one that is breaking 
free from objects: it individualises through endless chains of 
contractual relating, and encourages entrepreneurship as the means 
by which one can strive to immunise oneself against one’s own 
contractual obligations. To be owed but not to owe is now the only 
dream or passion worth entertaining. It is the triumph of techno-
libertarianism over any democratic impulse. The irony, of course, is 
that the object has not gone anywhere, so what needs to be 
represented now, what is valuable now for those commoners 
subsisting outside of finance, is the denigration of the object: the 
object that denies its own object-ness; as if the land were not land, 
but a source of income generation for the future. More to the point, 
there is also a denigration of the city in play here, meaning that it, 
the city, is no longer the space of bodies, the collection of humans 
who must, in their co-existence, take up space together, but instead 
simply the place from which, it is hoped, the space of the body might 
be overcome once and for all, made irrelevant in the constantly 
malleable texture of cities now become nothing more than ‘technical 
images’.43 If one recalls the early science fiction of William Gibson, 
who coined the term ‘cyberspace’, that fiction described a virtual 
world, made of signs, protocols, and algorithms, that one entered 
through a head set and manipulated with a keyboard; but maybe the 
only difference is that this virtual world, cyberspace, is not in our 
computers, but is now in the world itself, in our cities. The smart 
phone doesn’t mediate the world or signify the city to us; it interfaces 
the world, overlays it, and suggests that it, the city, isn’t there at all. 
Buy or leave. 
                                                       
43 Vilém Flusser, Into the Universe of Technical Images (Nancy Ann Roth tr, U 
Minn P 2011).  
